EU CRA reporting is now mandatory. Is your installed base ready?

Jukka Halttunen

Some EU Cyber Resilience Act guidance treats every manufacturer as if the answer is to re-architect the product urgently. For industrial devices operating inside larger systems, that is usually not true. The rules apply. The re-architecture usually does not. 

The EU CRA full requirements apply from 11 December 2027. Most industrial manufacturers we talk to know this date. Fewer have noticed that Article 14 starts fifteen months earlier, on 11 September 2026. Under Article 69(3), Article 14 applies to products already placed on the EU market before the full regulation applies. 

The CRA is often described as a new-product problem. For most industrial manufacturers with long product lifecycles, it is an installed-base problem first. 

Your installed base is every product you have shipped that is still in use somewhere in the EU. For an industrial manufacturer, that population is usually much larger than what you will ship this quarter. 

What Article 14 requires from 11 September 2026 

From 11 September 2026, manufacturers must report two categories of event: actively exploited vulnerabilities, and severe cybersecurity incidents that affect product security. Each category has its own reporting steps. 

For actively exploited vulnerabilities, reporting deadlines run from when the manufacturer becomes aware of the active exploitation:

  • 24 hours: an early warning to the CSIRT designated as coordinator for the manufacturer’s main establishment. The notification is made simultaneously available to ENISA. One submission, not two. 
  • 72 hours: a fuller notification with an initial assessment 
  • 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is available: a final report 

For severe incidents: 

  • 24 hours: an early warning 
  • 72 hours: a fuller notification 
  • One month after the 72-hour notification: a final report

Reporting goes through ENISA’s Single Reporting Platform (SRP), operational since 11 September 2026. Manufacturers can now submit mandatory notifications through the platform. ENISA provides user manuals, guidance and a field-by-field glossary to help manufacturers prepare and complete reports.

Article 14 also requires manufacturers to notify affected users about the vulnerability or incident, and where appropriate the corrective measures. This is a legal obligation, not good practice. 

Article 14 is written to apply going forward. What you become aware of on or after 11 September 2026 falls under the reporting duty. Pre-existing knowledge is not automatically pulled in by the date. 

What happens if you miss a deadline 

Article 14 reporting obligations have applied since 11 September 2026, but the CRA’s administrative penalty provisions under Article 64 generally apply from 11 December 2027. Those provisions envisage fines of up to €15 million or 2.5% of worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher, for breaches of Article 14.

The reporting duty matters now, regardless of the penalty timetable. Manufacturers need to know when an event is reportable, which products are affected and how to inform customers.

The less visible risks matter more: 

  • Every notification you file becomes a record on the CSIRT and ENISA  
  • A notification of a vulnerability you cannot fix creates a documented finding while your customers are still using the product 

The last point turns the conversation from paperwork to customer relationship. 

Your real problem is the products you have already shipped 

For a new product in development, CRA compliance is a design and documentation problem. You make the architecture decisions once. You include the requirements from the start. You ship the product with a completed EU CRA Declaration of Conformity behind you.  

For products already in use, the shape of the problem is different. What has to work from 11 September is not the secure-by-design status of the product. It is your ability to detect, classify, report, and remediate a vulnerability across a product portfolio that shipped years ago. Different product generations may have different architectures. Different technical documentation. Different customer commitments. 

If you make drives, HVAC controllers or connected industrial equipment, your installed base is usually much larger than a quarter of new shipments. Article 14 reporting applies to existing products within the CRA’s scope, including those placed on the EU market before 11 December 2027. That does not automatically subject those products to the full cybersecurity requirements that take effect in December 2027.

Four questions about your own product 

The 24-hour, 72-hour, and 14-day clocks look manageable on paper. In practice, they are four engineering capabilities. 

  1. Would you know? Awareness of an actively exploited vulnerability can come from a customer report, security researcher, threat intelligence or your own telemetry. But once an issue is reported, could you establish whether a device you shipped in 2017 is affected? Security logs, firmware component records and reliable version information make that assessment easier. Without them, confirming exposure across an older product line can be slow and uncertain. 
  2. Could you scope it? Once awareness is reached on one product, the 72-hour notification asks which products and versions are affected. If your fleet has no unique per-device identity and no reliable version reporting, you cannot scope the exposure. You will either report too many products and alarm every customer, or report too few and give a regulator wrong information. On legacy embedded platforms, even the SBOM often has to be built by hand. Off-the-shelf tooling does not always work for older toolchains and firmware images. 
  3. Could you build a fix? The 14-day clock starts when a corrective measure is available. For a 2016 product family, “available” means the build chain still works. Is the toolchain archived? Is the build reproducible? Do you hold the signing keys? Does the device accept a signed update at all?  
  4. Could you deliver it to the field? Even if the fix exists, delivery is a separate problem. Does the field procedure require a technician with a laptop and a serial cable? Can you update the device over the air? Can you roll back a bad image without breaking a fleet of devices? 

The Article 14 rule that changes the conversation 

Article 14 does not require you to fix the vulnerability. It requires you to notify an EU authority, and your customers, that an actively exploited vulnerability has been identified in your product. 

If you cannot deliver a fix, you have created a documented finding with an EU authority that a product you shipped has a security problem. That is not a paperwork problem. It is a market access and customer relationship problem. Your customers then choose what to do. Some accept the risk. Some replace the product. Some wait for a fix. Where you sit in that conversation depends on whether you can offer one. 

The trap is not the patch. It is the architecture you build to deliver it. 

Under Article 69(2), products placed on the market before 11 December 2027 generally become subject to the full CRA requirements if they undergo a substantial modification after that date. Routine security updates that reduce cybersecurity risk without changing the product’s intended purpose or introducing new risks are generally not substantial modifications.

Adding remote update capability to a product line that never had it is a different engineering decision. New interfaces, data flows and dependencies may introduce risks that were not considered in the original design.

That does not automatically make the change a substantial modification. It requires a case-by-case assessment of the product’s intended purpose, cybersecurity risks and affected requirements.

The important question is not only whether you can deliver a security fix. It is whether the architecture you introduce to deliver it changes the product’s cybersecurity risk profile. 

If you have IEC 62443 work already 

Existing IEC 62443 work provides a useful starting point for CRA readiness, particularly for product security controls and documented engineering practices. But it does not automatically establish CRA compliance. Vulnerability handling, reporting, support obligations and documentation still need to be assessed against the specific product and the manufacturer’s processes.

The other clock: a decade-scale support obligation

Article 13(8) generally requires at least five years of security support, and longer where the product is reasonably expected to remain in use longer. An exception applies to products with a genuinely shorter expected lifetime. For equipment with 7 to 20 year field lifecycles, that is a decade-scale sustaining-engineering commitment covering security updates, technical documentation, EU Declaration of Conformity maintenance, and user instructions. Most industrial manufacturers have not planned for this yet. Worth asking now: which product families would you commit to supporting under Article 13 conditions, and which would you phase out before December 2027? 

What to do now 

Short and sequenced. 

  1. Inventory what is on the EU market. For each product family, name the legal entity that acts as the manufacturer under CRA. 
  2. Name a reporting owner and a deputy. Make sure both have EU Login accounts with multi-factor authentication enabled.
  3. Identify your CSIRT designated as coordinator. When you need to submit a notification, register through ENISA’s Single Reporting Platform and select that CSIRT. ENISA advises against registering on the platform pre-emptively. CSIRT validation can take place while the notification is being processed.
  4. Rehearse one report on paper. Use a real product family and ENISA’s published field list. Time yourselves. 
  5. Ask the harder question separately. If an actively exploited vulnerability is discovered in that product family, could you still build, validate and deliver a fix? The 14-day deadline applies to the final report after a corrective or mitigating measure becomes available, not to developing the fix itself. Building that capability may take months. 

Four of these are process work. Any competent consultancy can help. The fifth is engineering work on the actual device: whether you can build a fix, deliver it to the field, and prove which units received it. That is where Proekspert comes in. 

How we help 

We work on connected industrial devices that operate inside larger systems: drives, HVAC, weighing, process control. Not consumer electronics. The engineering that makes items like “could you build a fix” and “could you deliver it to the field” answerable: secure firmware update paths, device identity and versioning, IEC 62443 documentation, and CRA-readiness delivery for legacy platforms. 

We supported Danfoss Drives in achieving IEC 62443 Security Level 1 readiness on the VLT® platform and MCT10 configuration tool, without hardware redesign. The TÜV SÜD audit passed with no major issues. 

“Their team supported risk analysis and certification feasibility on legacy platforms, working closely with us to balance compliance, usability, and real customer needs. Their hands-on experts ensured our products are fit for today’s market and tomorrow’s regulations.” 

Tim Flintholm Fink, Product Owner, HVAC and Aqua Drives, Danfoss Drives 

We also supported BLH Nobel with CRA compliance analysis on a long-lived industrial weighing device deployed in cranes, mining, and process industries. Same conclusion: CRA and CE-marking alignment achievable through targeted software upgrades. No hardware redesign. 

The same engineers who find these gaps build the software that closes them. That is the difference between assessing CRA readiness and delivering it. 

Challenge us!

Bring one real product line. Tell us the product family, roughly how many units are in the field, and who owns the firmware. Our engineers will review what Article 14 actually means for that specific product and come back with a first read. 

This is for manufacturers placing connected products on the EU market. Get in touch through our CRA service page or by email at jukka.halttunen@proekspert.com.